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Abstract
This paper proposes a semi-parametric method to uncover the distribution of bidders’
private information in the market for highway procurement when unobserved auction het-
erogeneity is present. I derive suﬃcient conditions under which the model is identiﬁed
and show that the estimation procedure produces uniformly consistent estimators of the
distributions in question.
The estimation procedure is applied to data from Michigan highway procurement auc-
tions. I estimate that 75% of the variation in bidders’ costs may be attributed to the
factors known to all bidders and only 25% may be generated by private information. My
results suggest that failing to account for unobserved auction heterogeneity may lead to
overestimating uncertainty that bidders face when submitting their bids. As a result both
ineﬃciency of the auction mechanism and mark-ups over the bidders’ costs may be over-
estimated.
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In auction markets, the performance of a particular mechanism crucially depends on the degree
of uncertainty faced by market participants. In private values environments, a growing liter-
ature started by Laﬀont, Ossard, Vuong (1995) and Guerre, Perrigne, Vuong (2000) uses the
equilibrium relationship between bids and bidders’ costs to uncover the distribution of private
information. After controlling for observed auction characteristics, the estimation procedures
proposed in the literature typically assume that remaining variation in bids is generated by
variation in private information. Existing procedures do not allow for the possibility that
bidders take into account some characteristics of the auction that the researcher cannot ob-
serve. Therefore, they can signiﬁcantly overestimate the magnitude of private information if
unobserved auction heterogeneity is present.
This paper constructs a model that incorporates both private information and un-
observed auction heterogeneity. It develops a semi-parametric estimation method to recover
distributions of private information and unobserved auction heterogeneity from submitted bids.
It also establishes suﬃcient conditions under which these distributions are identiﬁed and shows
uniform consistency of the estimators. The estimation method is applied to data from Michi-
gan highway procurement auctions to quantify the importance of private information in this
market and to study the biases that result from ignoring unobserved auction heterogeneity.
I assume that project cost for any particular bidder equals the product of a common
and an individual component. The common component consists of cost attributes known to
all bidders, some of which may not be observed by the researcher. The individual component
consists of additional cost attributes privately observed by each bidder. This costs structure
implies that the distribution of costs may vary across projects even after all project character-
istics known to the researcher are held constant. In addition, I allow bidders to be asymmetric,
so that the distribution of individual cost component may vary with observable characteristics
of the bidder.
I exploit dependence between bids submitted in the same auction to recover the dis-
tributions of the common and individual components of bids. In particular, I show that the
distributions of components are identiﬁed from the joint distribution of two arbitrary bids sub-
mitted in the same auction when the individual cost components are independently distributed
across bidders and are independent from the common component. Further, the distributions
of individual bid components are used to uncover the distributions of individual cost compo-
nents. This new identiﬁcation result provides insight into sources of identiﬁcation for more
general models with unobserved auction heterogeneity. The estimation procedure proposed in
t h ep a p e rf o l l o w st h es t e p so ft h ei d e n t i ﬁcation argument.
1I conduct a Monte Carlo study to analyze small sample behavior as well as sensitivity
of the estimation procedure to the assumptions of the model. Simulation analysis shows that
this procedure behaves well in samples of moderate size. It also correctly recovers individual
components and a degenerate common component when applied to data generated by the
model with independent private values and no unobserved auction heterogeneity.
I also study the consequences of misspecifying the model and failing to account for
unobserved auction heterogeneity. I ﬁnd that, when applied to data with unobserved auction
heterogeneity, the estimation procedures based on the assumptions of independent private
values or aﬃliated private values tend to recover bid functions that are much ﬂatter than the
true bid function and to predict mark-ups that are signiﬁcantly higher than the ones implied
by the true distribution. They also predict a higher chance of ineﬃcient outcomes, i.e., when
projects are not assigned to the lowest cost bidder. Also, the recovered distributions of costs
have higher variances than the true distributions.
The proposed method is implemented using data for highway maintenance projects
auctioned by the Michigan Department of Transportation between February 1997 and Decem-
ber 2003. This set of highway procurement projects has features consistent with unobserved
auction heterogeneity. For example, the bidders participating in such auctions have access to a
detailed description of the project and travel to the project site. Therefore they likely to have
an advantage over the researcher in recognizing the diﬀerences in the distributions of costs
across projects. On the other hand, these projects are precisely speciﬁed and quite simple, so
that this market is well described by the assumption of private values.
Descriptive analysis of the data indicates that unobserved auction heterogeneity may
be present. In particular, ﬁxed and random eﬀects regressions show that a large component
of bids’ variation could be attributed to the so-called "between variation" or variation across
auctions.
I use the estimation procedure developed in this paper to estimate the bidding strategies
and the distributions of individual and common cost components. Results indicate that 85% of
the variation in costs is explained by the variation in the common component. The estimated
bid function implies an average mark-up over the bidders’ costs of around 7%. In contrast, the
model with aﬃliated private values predicts average mark-ups of 11%, whereas the model with
independent private values predicts 15%. The diﬀerence amounts to $33,000 in the case of
aﬃliated private values and $61,000 for the model with independent private values. I estimate
that there is a 28% chance of an ineﬃcient outcome, which is lower than that obtained under
alternative procedures. I also estimate expected distribution of total costs. The variance of
the cost distribution estimated under the assumption of unobserved auction heterogeneity is
about 25% lower that the variance of the cost distribution estimated under the assumption
2of aﬃl i a t e dp r i v a t ev a l u e sa n d3 5 %l o w e rt h a nt h ev a r i a n c eo ft h ec o s td i s t r i b u t i o ne s t i m a t e d
under the assumption of independent private values. Finally, I perform several robustness
checks for the assumptions of the model.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 discusses
identiﬁcation, testable implications and some extensions of the model. Section 4 details the
estimation procedure and summarizes results of the simulation study. Section 5 presents results
of estimation and section 6 concludes.
1.1 Related Literature
This paper adds to the literature on estimation of auction models that aims to uncover distri-
bution of bidders’ private information from the bids submitted in the auction. In particular,
Donald and Paarsch (1993, 1996) and Laﬀont, Ossard and Vuong (1995) develop parametric
methods to recover the distribution of cost from the observed distribution of bids. Elyakime,
Laﬀont, Loisel and Vuong (1994, 1997) propose a nonparametric method to estimate distribu-
tion of cost. Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2000) study identiﬁcation of the First-Price auction
model with symmetric bidders. They establish that the distribution of bidders’ valuations can
be identiﬁed from bid data if and only if the empirical inverse bid function is increasing. They
propose a uniformly consistent estimation procedure. Li, Perrigne, and Vuong (2000, 2002)
extend the result to the aﬃliated private values and the conditionally independent private val-
ues models. Campo, Perrigne, and Vuong (2001)p r o v ei d e n t i ﬁcation and develop a uniformly
consistent estimation procedure for ﬁrst-price auctions with asymmetric bidders and aﬃliated
private values. These papers rely on the assumption of no unobserved auction heterogene-
ity, i.e., they explicitly use a one-to-one mapping between distribution of bidders’ costs and
distribution of observed bids that arises in such environments.
The few papers that indirectly address the issue of unobserved auction heterogeneity
include Campo, Perrigne, and Vuong (2001), Bajari and Ye (2003) and Hong and Shum (2002).
The ﬁrst two papers rely on the assumption that the number of bidders can serve as a suﬃ-
cient statistic for the unobserved auction heterogeneity. Hong and Shum (2002) account for
unobserved auction heterogeneity by modelling the median of the bid distribution as a normal
random variable with a mean that depends on the number of bidders. In this paper, I allow
for unobserved auction heterogeneity to vary even within the subset of auctions with the same
number of bidders. I estimate non-trivial auction speciﬁc component after controlling for the
number of bidders, which implies that these papers may underestimate common information
available to all bidders. In contrast to this literature, I also study identiﬁcation of the model
and implications of failing to account for unobserved auction heterogeneity.
3To the best of my knowledge, only a couple of papers directly address the issue of
unobserved auction heterogeneity. Athey and Haile (2001) study unobserved auction hetero-
geneity in the context of second-price and English auctions. Chakraborty and Deltas (1998)
assume that the distribution of bidders’ valuations belongs to a two-parameter distribution
family. They use this assumption to derive small sample estimates for the corresponding pa-
rameters of the auction-speciﬁc valuation distributions. The estimates are later regressed on
the observable auction characteristics to determine the percent of values variation that could
be attributed to unobserved auction heterogeneity. The methodology is applied to data for
packages of real estate loans. They ﬁnd a signiﬁcant auction-speciﬁc component in their data.
In this sense, my results are consistent with their ﬁndings.
Highway procurement auctions have already been studied in the literature. Porter and
Zona (1993) ﬁnd evidence of collusion in Long Island highway procurement auctions. Bajari
and Ye (2003) reject the hypothesis of collusive behavior in the procurement auctions conducted
in Minnesota, North Dakota, and South Dakota. Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer (2003) ﬁnd
evidence of capacity constraints in California highway procurement auctions. Hong and Shum
(2002) ﬁnd some evidence of common values in the bidders’ costs in the case of New Jersey
highway construction auctions.
2T h e M o d e l
This section describes the ﬁrst-price auction model under unobserved auction heterogeneity
and summarizes properties of the equilibrium bidding strategies.
The seller oﬀers a single project for sale to m bidders. Bidder i0s cost is equal to the
product of two components: one is common and known to all bidders; the other is individual
and private information of the ﬁrm i. Both the common and the individual cost components
are random variables, and they are denoted by the capital letters Y and X respectively. The
small letters y and x denote realizations of the common component and the vector of individual
components. The two random variables (Y , X) are distributed on [y,y]×[x,x]m, y > 0, x > 0,
according to the probability distribution function H,
Pr(Y ≤ y0,X≤ x0)=H(y0,x 0).
Asymmetries between bidders: I assume that there are two types of bidders: m1 bidders
are of type 1, and m2 bidders, m2 =( m−m1), are of type 2. Thus, the vector of independent
4cost components is given by X =( X11,..,X1m1,X 2(m1+1),..,X 2m). The model and all the
results can easily be extended to the case of m types. I focus on the case of two types for the
sake of expositional clarity. Types are deﬁned from the observable characteristics of bidders.
Assumptions (D1) − (D4) are maintained throughout the paper.








where HY , HX1,a n dHX2 are marginal distribution functions of Y , X1j, and X2j respectively.The
supports of HY and HXk are given by S(HY )=[ y,y],y> 0,y≤ y; S(Hk)=[ x,x], x > 0,
x ≤ x, for k ∈ {1,2}.
(D2) The probability density functions of the individual cost components, hX1 and hX2,
are continuously diﬀerentiable and bounded away from zero on every closed subset of (x,x).
(D3) EX1j =1for all j =1 ,...,m 1.
(D4)( a) T h en u m b e ro fb i d d e r si sc o m m o nk n o w l e d g e ;
(b) There is no binding reservation price.
Assumption (D2) ensures the existence of equilibrium. The identiﬁcation result relies
on assumptions (D1) and (D3). In particular, assumption (D3) is used to ﬁx the scale of
the distribution of the individual cost component for a bidder of type 1. (D4) summarizes
miscellaneous assumptions about the auction environment.
The auction environment can be described as a collection of auction games indexed by
the diﬀerent values of the common component. An auction game corresponding to the common
component equal to y, y ∈ [y,y], is analyzed below.
The cost realization of bidder i is equal to xi ∗ y, where xi is the realization of the
individual cost component. The information set of bidder i is given by Pyi = {xi|xi ∈ [x,x]}.
A bidding strategy of bidder i is a real-valued function deﬁned on [x,x]
βyi :[ x,x] → [0,∞].
I use a small Greek letter β with subscript yi to denote the strategy of bidder i as a
function of the individual cost components and a small Roman letter b to denote the value of
this function at a particular realization xi.
5Expected proﬁt. The proﬁt realization of the bidder i, πyi(bi,b −i,x i),e q u a l s(bi−xi∗y)
if bidder i wins the project and zero if he loses. The symbol bi denotes the bid submitted by
bidder i, and the symbol b−i denotes the vector of bids submitted by bidders other than i.A t
the time of bidding, bidder i knows y and xi but not b−i. The bidder who submits the lowest
bid wins the project. The interium expected proﬁto fb i d d e ri is given by
E[πyi|X = xi,Y = y]=( bi − xi ∗ y) ∗ Pr(bi ≤ bj,∀j 6= i|Y = y).
A Bayesian Nash Equilibrium is then characterized by a vector of functions βy =
{βy1,...,βym} such that byi = βyi(xi) maximizes E[πi|X = xi,Y = y], when bj = βyj(xj),
j 6= i, j =1 ,..,m; for every i =1 ,..,mand for every realization of Xi.
LeBrun (1999) and others establish that, under assumptions (D1) − (D2), av e c t o ro f
equilibrium bidding strategies βy = {βy1,...,βym} exists. The strategies are strictly monotone
and diﬀerentiable. Maskin and Riley (2000) show that under these assumptions there is a
unique vector of equilibrium strategies, βy = {βy1,...,βym}, which satisfy the following bound-
ary condition: for all iβ yi(x)=x, and there exists dyi ∈ [x,x] such that βyi(x)=dyi.
These results accordingly establish equilibrium existence and uniqueness in the game
where the common cost component equals y.
Next, I characterize a simple property of the equilibrium bidding strategies.
Proposition 1
If (α1(.),...,αm(.)) is a vector of equilibrium bidding strategies in the game with y =1 ,
then the vector of equilibrium bidding strategies in the game with y, y ∈ [y,y], is given by
βy = {βy1,...,βym}, such that βyi(xi)=y ∗ αi(xi),i=1 ,...,m.
The proposition shows that the bid function is multiplicatively separable into a common
and an individual bid component, where the individual bid component is given by αi(.). The
proof of this proposition is based on the comparison of the two sets of ﬁrst-order conditions
and follows immediately from the assumption that costs are multiplicatively separable and
that the common component is known to all bidders.
Next, I characterize the necessary ﬁrst-order conditions for the set of equilibrium strate-
gies when y =1 . Note that αi(.) denotes a strategy of bidder i as a function of the individual
cost component and ai the value of this function for a particular realization of Xi.T h ee q u i -
librium inverse bid function of the individual bid component for a type k bidder is denoted
6by φk. Since the function αk(.) is strictly monotone and diﬀerentiable, the function φk(.) is
well-deﬁned and diﬀerentiable.
The probability of winning in this game can be expressed as
Pr(aj ≥ ai,∀j 6= i)=[ ( 1− HXk(i)(φk(i)(ai)))](mk(i)−1)[(1 − HX−k(i)(φ−k(i)(ai)))]m−k(i),
where k(i) denotes bidder i0s type and ” − k(i)” denotes the complementary type.
The necessary ﬁrst-order conditions are, then, given by
1
a − φk(i)(a)










k(.) denotes the derivative of φk(.).
Equation (1) characterizes the equilibrium inverse individual bid function when y =1 .
It describes a trade-oﬀ the bidder faces when choosing a bid: an increase in the markup over
the cost may lead to a higher ex-post proﬁti fb i d d e ri wins, but it reduces the probability of
winning. The bid a is chosen in such a way that the marginal eﬀects of an inﬁnitesimal change
in a bid on the winner’s proﬁt and the probability of winning sum to zero.
The next section uses properties of the equilibrium bidding functions to show how the
primitives of the ﬁrst-price auction model can be recovered from the submitted bids in the
presence of unobserved auction heterogeneity.
3I d e n t i ﬁcation and Testable Implications
The ﬁrst part of this section formulates an identiﬁcation problem and provides conditions
under which a ﬁrst-price auction model with unobserved auction heterogeneity is identiﬁed.
The second part describes restrictions this model imposes on the data. The third part discusses
possible extensions.
3.1 Identiﬁcation
I assume that the econometrician has access to bid data, based on n independent draws from
the joint distribution of (Y,X). The observable data are in the form {bij}, where i denotes
7the identity of the bidder, i =1 ,..,m;a n dj denotes project, j =1 ,...,n.I f d a t a r e p r e s e n t
equilibrium outcomes of the model with unobserved auction heterogeneity, then
bij = βyjk(i)(xij) (2)
(i.e., bij is a value of bidder i’s equilibrium bidding strategy corresponding to yj evaluated at
the point xij).
As was shown in the previous section, bij depends on the realizations of the common and
individual components as well as on the joint distribution of the individual cost components.
This section examines under what conditions on available data there exists a unique triple
{{xij},{yj},H X} that satisﬁes 2, i.e., under what conditions the model from a previous section
is identiﬁed.
Guerre, Perrigne, and Voung (2000) obtain an identiﬁcation result by transforming the
ﬁrst-order conditions for optimal bids to express a bidder’s cost as an explicit function of the
submitted bid, the bid probability density function, and the bid distribution function. Under
unobserved auction heterogeneity, the necessary ﬁrst-order condition yields an expression for
xij · yj as a function of bij and the conditional bid probability density function and the condi-
tional bid distribution function conditional on Y = yj. The econometrician does not observe
the realization of Y and, consequently, does not know the conditional distribution of bids for
Y = yj. Hence, it is not possible to establish identiﬁc a t i o nb a s e do nt h ea b o v eﬁrst-order
conditions.
The idea of my approach is to focus on the joint distributions of bids submitted in
the same auction instead of the marginal bid distributions in order to identify the model with
unobserved auction heterogeneity.
Iu s eBi to denote the random variable that describes the bid of bidder i with distribu-
tion function GBk(i)(.) and the associated probability density function gBk(i)(.); bij denotes the
realization of this variable in the auction j. The econometrician observes the joint distribution
function of (Bi1,..,Bil) for all subsets (i1,...,i l) of (1,...,m).
Proposition 1 establishes that
bij = yj ∗ aij,
where aij is a hypothetical bid that would have been submitted by bidder i if y were equal
to one. I use Ai to denote the random variable with realizations equal to aij. The associated
distribution function is denoted by GAk(i)(.) with the probability density function gAk(i)(.).
Notice that the econometrician does not observe yj and neither therefore aij. The distribution
8of Ai is latent.
My identiﬁcation result is established in two steps. First, it is shown that the probabil-
ity density functions of Y, Ai’s can be uniquely determined from the joint distribution of two
bids that share the same cost component. Second, monotonicity of the inverse bid function
is used to establish identiﬁcation of the probability density functions HX1 and HX2 from the
distributions of the individual bid components, GA1 and GA2.
The following theorem is the main result of this section. It formulates suﬃcient iden-
tiﬁcation conditions for the model with unobserved heterogeneity.
Theorem 1
If conditions (D1)−(D4) are satisﬁed, then probability density functions hY (.), hX1(.)
and hX2(.) are identiﬁed from the joint distribution of (Bi1,B i2),w h e r e(i1,i 2) is any pair
such that i1 ∈ {1,..,m 1}; i2 ∈ {m1 +1 ,..,m}.
Theorem 1 states that the distribution functions of cost components HXk(.) and HY (.)
are identiﬁed. The proof of this theorem consists of two steps and is given in Part A of
the Appendix. In the ﬁrst step, a statistical result by Kotlarski1 (1966) is applied to the
log-transformed random variables Bi1 and Bi2 given by
log(Bi1)=l o g ( Y )+l o g ( Ai1),
log(Bi2)=l o g ( Y )+l o g ( Ai2).
Kotlarski’s result is based on the fact that the characteristic function of the sum of two inde-
pendent random variables is equal to the product of characteristic functions of these variables.
This property allows us to ﬁnd the characteristic functions of log(Y ), log(Ai1), and log(Ai2)
from the joint characteristic function of (log(Bi1),log(Bi2)). It leads to the following three
equations:















9where Ψ(.,.) and Ψ1(.,.) denote the joint characteristic function of (log(Bi1),log(Bi2)) and the
partial derivative of this characteristic function with respect to the ﬁrst component respectively.
Since there is a one-to-one correspondence between the set of characteristic functions and the
set of probability density functions, the probability density functions of Y , Ai1, Ai2 can be
uniquely deduced from the characteristic functions of log(Y ), log(Ai1), and log(Ai2) since log(.)
is a strictly increasing function; αk(.),k=1 ,2, are increasing functions of x; [x,x] ⊂ (0,∞),
[y,y] ⊂ (0,∞). Notice that the marginal distribution of a single bid per auction may not allow
us to identify the distribution functions of Y , Ai1, Ai2 because there is no unique decomposition
of the sum (or product) into its components. The second step in the proof establishes that the
distribution of the individual cost component is identiﬁed with (possibly) asymmetric bidders
and independent private values. It is similar to the argument given in Laﬀont and Vuong
(1996).
A related question concerns identiﬁcation of speciﬁc realizations xij and yj correspond-
ing to a particular bid bij. In this case, the answer is negative: xij and yj cannot be separately
identiﬁed. The reason is that for every value of y from the support of the distribution HY (.),
we can ﬁnd values {xij},i=1 ,..,m, such that a vector (x1j,..,x mj,y), together with the
distribution functions HXk(.),k=1 ,2, rationalizes the vector of bids {bij},i=1 ,..,m.M o r e
details are provided in Part A of the Appendix after the proof of Theorem 1.
Theorem 1 establishes that identiﬁcation of the model with unobserved auction het-
erogeneity crucially relies on the assumption of independence of individual components across
bidders and from the common cost component. Next, we show how validity of these assump-
tions can be evaluated within a framework of the model with unobserved auction heterogeneity.
3.2 Testable Implications










)=l o g ( Ai1)−log(Ai3) and log(
Bi2
Bi3
)=l o g ( Ai2)−log(Ai3).
Here log(Ai3) plays the role of a common component whereas log(Ai1) and log(Ai2) remain
individual components. If the individual cost components Xi1, Xi2 and Xi3 are independently
distributed, then so are log(Ai1), log(Ai2), and log(Ai3). The characteristic functions of these







I denote by Θ(.,.), according to a formula similar to equation (3).2 Speciﬁcally,
2The symbol Θ1(.,.) denotes the partial derivative of Θ(.,.) with respect to the ﬁrst argument.










Two observations can be made at this point. First, if Bi1 and Bi3 are submitted by
bidders of the same type and the assumption about independence of individual components
holds, then Λlog(Ai3)(t) and Λlog(Ai1)(t) should be equal. Second, I have relied only on the
functional form and the independence of the individual cost components assumptions to obtain
Λlog(Aik)(.). The assumption of independence of Y and X then implies that Λlog(Ai3)(.) and
Λlog(Ai1)(.) have to coincide with the functions given by (3). These observations are summarized
by conditions (W1) and (W2).
(W1) For any triple (i1,i 2,i 3) such that {i1 =1 ,..,m1 and i3 =1 ,..,m}, or { i1 =
m1 +1 ,..,mandi 3 = m1 +1 ,..,m},
Λlog(Ai1)(t)=Λlog(Ai3)(t)
for every t ∈ [−∞,∞].
(W2) For any triple (i1,i 2,i 3),
Φlog(Ai3)(t)=Λlog(Ai3)(t),
Φlog(Ai1)(t)=Λlog(Ai1)(t)
for every t ∈ [−∞,∞]. Here Φlog(Ai3)(t) and Φlog(Ai1)(t) denote the characteristic functions of
the log of the individual bid components deﬁned earlier in the identiﬁcation section.
Independence of individual cost components further implies condition (W3).








Proposition 2 describes implications of the independence assumptions.
Proposition 2
11Let bidder i’s cost for the project j be given by cij = xij ∗ yj.
(1) If the individual cost components are independent, then (W1) has to be satisﬁed.
(2)If the individual cost components are independent, then (W3) has to be satisﬁed.
(3) Further, if Y is independent of X, then W2 holds.
The proof of proposition 2 is given in Part A of the Appendix.
3.3 Rationalization
The identiﬁcation section derives conditions under which primitives of a model with unobserved
auction heterogeneity can be uniquely recovered from data generated within the framework
of this model. Next, I address an issue of model rationalization, i.e., I identify properties
of data that allow us to conclude that a particular data set could have been generated by
the model with unobserved auction heterogeneity. Then we discuss if and how the model
with unobserved heterogeneity can be distinguished from other models consistent with private
values environment.
Conditions below describe a set of joint restrictions imposed on data by all the assump-
tions of the model with unobserved auction heterogeneity.
(W4) For every pair (il,i p), il =1 ,...,m1; ip = m1+1,..,m,the functions Φlog(Y )(.),Φlog(Ail)(.),
Φlog(Aip)(.) given by (2) represent characteristic functions of real-valued variables.
(W5) The characteristic functions Φlog(Y )(.),Φlog(Ail)(.) and Φlog(Aip)(.) do not depend
on the pair of (il,i p), il =1 ,...,m1; ip = m1 +1 ,..,m,which was used to derive them.
(W6) The inverse bid functions
φk(a)=a −
(1 − GAk(a))(1 − GA−k(a))
(mk − 1)gAk(a)(1 − GA−k(a)) + m−kgA−k(a)(1 − GAk(a))
,k=1 ,2,
are strictly increasing in a.
Proposition 3
If available data satisfy conditions (W4) − (W6), then there exists a model with unob-
served heterogeneity that could have generated the data.
12The ﬁrst condition guarantees that two independent random variables Y and Ai exist
with the property Bi = Y ∗ Ai. The third condition ensures that A0
is are consistent with the
equilibrium behavior under the independent private values assumption. The ﬁrst and second
assumptions guarantee that bidders within each of the types are identical.
The model with independent private values is nested in the model with independent
private values. Condition (W7) provides the basis for Proposition 4, which shows how the
null of independent private values can be tested against the alternative of independent private
values.
(W7) The distribution of log(Y ) is degenerate.
Proposition 4
If conditions (W4) and (W7) are satisﬁed then data are generated by the model with
independent private values.
While I do not have a formal proof, my conjecture is that the model with unobserved
auction heterogeneity and aﬃliated individual components cannot be identiﬁed from bid data.
Li, Perrigne and Vuong (2002) outline conditions for the rationalization of the model with aﬃl-
iated private values. If conditions of proposition 3 are satisﬁed simultaneously with conditions
in Li, Perrigne and Vuong (2002), then the three models - the model with unobserved auction
heterogeneity and independent individual components, the model with unobserved auction het-
erogeneity and aﬃliated individual components, and the model with aﬃliated private values -
are observationally equivalent.
3.4 Extensions
The model with unobserved auction heterogeneity assumes that bidder i0s cost of completing
the project equals the product of the common and the individual cost components. This
functional form emerges when the cost distribution for a particular project is scaled by a
project-speciﬁc common variable, in which case mean and variance vary with the common
component in a coordinated way.
A more general model may allow for the common component to have distinct eﬀects
on the mean and variance of the cost distribution function. Such a model can be constructed
13using a two-dimensional project heterogeneity. Bidder i0s cost of the project is, then, equal to
cij = y1j + y2j ∗ xij,
where (y1j,y 2j) is a realization of a two-dimensional cost component that is common knowledge
among all bidders; xij is a realization of an individual component, which is private information
of ﬁrm i.T h i ss p e c i ﬁcation has the following interpretation: the average cost of the project j
equals y1j, and the individual cost deviations have auction-speciﬁcs c a l e .I tc a nb es h o w nt h a t
the described model is identiﬁed under conditions similar to those in Theorem 1.T h e e x a c t
conditions and the proof are given in Part A of the Appendix.
4 Estimation
This section describes the estimation method, derives properties of the estimators, and dis-
cusses practical issues related to the estimation procedure.
4.1 Estimation Method
The econometrician has data for n auctions. For each auction j, (mj,{bij}
i=mj
i=1 ,z j) are ob-
served, where mj is the number of bidders in the auction j,w i t hmj1 bidders of type 1 and
mj2 bidders of type 2; {bij}
i=mj
i=1 is a vector of bids submitted in the auction j;a n dzj is a
vector of auction characteristics. The estimation procedure is described for the case of discrete
covariates. It can be extended to the case of continuous zj.
The estimates are obtained conditional on the number of bidders, mj = m0, m1j =
m01, and zj = z0.L e t n0 denote the number of auctions that satisfy these restrictions.
The estimation procedure closely follows the identiﬁcation argument described in the proof
of Theorem 1. It consists of two steps. First, the joint characteristic function of two log
t r a n s f o r m e db i d si se s t i m a t e df o re v e r y(t1,t 2) as a sample average of the exp(it1·Blj+it2·Bpj)),
where the average is taken across auctions with mj = m0,m 1j = m01 and zj = z0. Then the
joint characteristic function is used to compute the characteristic functions of the logs of
the common and the individual bid components according to the formulas given by (3). The
inversion formula is used to recover the probability density functions for the logs of the common
and the individual bid components from the characteristic functions. Finally, the probability
density functions of logs are used to recover the probability density functions of the common
and the individual bid components.
In the second step, the probability density functions of the individual bid components
14are used to obtain estimates of the probability density function of the individual cost com-
ponent. For that, a sample of pseudo-bids is drawn form the probability density function
of the relevant individual bid component. This sample is then used to obtain the sample of
pseudo-costs with the help of the corresponding inverse bid function. Finally, the sample of
pseudo-costs is used to non-parametrically estimate the probability density function of the
individual cost component.
To estimate the probability density function of the total cost of the bidder i at a point
c, I compute an integral of the function hXi(c
y) ∗ hY (y) with respect to y over the interval
[y,y]. To evaluate this integral, I perform Monte Carlo integration with respect to hY (.).3 The
value of an average inverse bid function at a point b is estimated as the mean of the value of
the individual bid function at a point b
y multiplied by y with respect to the distribution of y.
Again, Monte Carlo integration methods are used to compute the mean.
The details of the estimation procedure are outlined in the Appendix.
4.2 Properties of the Estimator
This subsection shows that the estimation procedure yields uniformly consistent estimators
of the relevant distributions. I use the result from Li and Vuong (1998) to establish uniform
consistency of the ﬁrst stage estimators. Their argument applies if probability distributions of
bid components satisfy following restrictions on the tail behavior of characteristic functions.
(D5) The characteristic functions φLY (.) and φLAk(.) are ordinary smooth4 with κ > 1.
This property holds, for example, when cumulative probability functions of cost com-
ponents admit up to R, R > 1, continuous derivatives on the support interior such that M of
them, 1 ≤ M ≤ R, can be continuously extended to the real line. The uniform consistency of
the ﬁrst stage estimators is used to establish uniform consistency of the estimator of individual
cost component distribution.
Proposition 5 summarizes properties of the estimator.
3Judd (2000) provides a detailed explanation of a Monte-Carlo integration method.
4Following Fan (1991),
Deﬁnition 1 The distribution of random variable Z is ordinary-smooth of order κ if its characteristic function
φz(t) satisﬁes
d0|t|
−κ ≤ |φz(t)| ≤ d1|t|
−κ
as t→∞for some positive constants d0,d1,κ.
15Proposition 5
If conditions (D1)-(D5) are satisﬁed, then b hY (.) and b hXk(.) are uniformly consistent
estimators of hY (.) and hXk(.),k=1 ,2, respectively.
The proof of Proposition 5 is presented in Part A of the Appendix.
4.3 Practical Issues
Several important comments must be made about the ﬁrst step. First, to reduce the error
in the characteristic function estimation, I scale bids to ﬁt into the interval [0,2π]. Second,
as noted by Diggle and Hall (1993) and Li, Perrigne and Vuong (2000), the estimators for
b hLY (.) and b hLA(.), which are obtained by truncated inverse Fourier transformation, may have
ﬂuctuating tails.5 This feature can be alleviated by adding a damping factor to the integrals
in b hLY (.) and b gLA(.). Following Diggle and Hall (1993) and Li, Perrigne and Vuong (2000), I





T ,i f|t| ≤ T
0,o t h e r w i s e
)
.













Third, the smoothing parameter T should be chosen to diverge slowly as n →∞ ,
so as to ensure uniform consistency of the estimators. However, the actual choice of T in
ﬁnite samples has not yet been addressed in the literature. I choose T through a data-driven
criterion. In particular, I use the bid data to obtain estimates of the means and variances
for distributions6 of LY and LA, b µLY , b µLA =0 , b σLY , b σLA. These estimates are then used to
choose a value of T.S p e c i ﬁcally, I try diﬀerent values of T a n do b t a i ne s t i m a t e so fhLY (.)
and hLA(.). From each estimated density I compute the means and variances e µLY , e µLA, e σLY ,
5Li,Perrigne and Vuong (2000) encountered this problem as well and dealt with it in a similar way.




n∗m , b µLA =0 , b σLA =
P
(log(bi1)−log(bi2))2
2∗n∗m , b σLY =
P
(log(bi))2
2∗n∗m − (b µLY )
2 − b σLA.
16e σLA, respectively. This gives goodness-of-ﬁtc r i t e r i o n|b µLY − e µLY | + |b σLY − e σLY | for LY ,a n d
similarly for LA.T h ev a l u eo fT that I choose minimizes the sum of these errors in percentage
of b σLY and b σLA. In the estimation, the optimal T equals 50.
The second step in the estimation involves taking random draws from the estimated
density. I use a rejection method.7 In this method random pairs (zj,a j) are drawn from the
uniform distribution on [0,r] × [a,a], where r is the maximum value that b hA(.) attains on the
support of the distribution of A.T h e n ,aj is added to the sample of pseudo-bids if zj ≤ b hA(aj).
The resulting sample of pseudo-bids is distributed according to b hA(.).
The second step of the estimation involves non-parametric estimation of the density and
distribution function. In the density estimation a tri-weight kernel is used, because it satisﬁes
conditions of compact support and continuous diﬀerentiability on the support, including the




(1 − u2)31(|u| ≤ 1).
I follow Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong(2000) in my choice of bandwidth, δg = dg(L)−1
6,
where dg i sc o m p u t e da c c o r d i n gt oa” r u l eo ft h u m b . ”S p e c i ﬁcally, I use dg =2 .978 × 1.06b σa,
where b σa is the standard deviation of the logarithm of (1+bids), and 2.978 follows from the
use of tri-weight kernel.9
Conﬁdence intervals for the estimates are obtained through a bootstrap procedure.
4.4 Monte Carlo Study
This section describes results of the Monte Carlo study. It consists of two parts. The ﬁrst part
studies small sample properties of the estimation procedure that accounts for the presence of
unobserved auction heterogeneity. The second part investigates the direction and magnitude of
the bias that arises when procedures that ignore unobserved auction heterogeneity are applied
to data that possess this feature. The results of the ﬁr s tp a r ta r es u m m a r i z e di nt a b l e s1b and
2b. In particular, table 1b describes the data generating process for each of the experiments,
whereas table 2b summarizes estimation results. For each data generating process I report the
chosen variances of the cost components, the variance of the total costs, the correlation between
common and individual components, the correlation of individual components across bidders,
7The rejection method was proposed by Newmann (1951). We need to know the support of the distribution
in question to apply this method. A procedure for the supports estimation is described in the Part A of the
Appendix.
8C o n d i t i o n sg i v e ni nL i ,a n dV u o n g( 1998) ensure uniform consistency of the second-stage estimator.
9See Hardle, 1991.
17the correlation of total costs across bidders and the expected mark-up over the bidders’ costs
implied by the equilibrium bid function. The estimation results include the variances of the
estimated distributions of components, the variance of the estimated distribution of total costs
as well as the estimated expected mark-up over the bidders’ cost. Table 3b summarizes results
of the second part. The study is performed for the case of symmetric bidders, i.e. all bidders
are assumed to draw their costs from the same distribution.
The simulated data sets are generated as follows. The cost of bidder i is assumed to
equal the sum of the common and the individual cost components, ci = y+xi. The individual
cost component is distributed according to the uniform distribution with mean ﬁxed at zero.
The common component is chosen to be distributed according to the power distribution with
the exponent equal to three and mean ﬁxed at 10.5.T o s t u d y t h e e ﬀe c to fa ni n c r e a s ei n
the correlation of bids on the performance of estimation procedures, I use power distributions
with diﬀerent variances. The distributions are chosen so that analytical expression for bidding
strategies can be derived in each case.10 To create a typical data set describing n procurement
auctions with k bidders, k ∗ n independent draws from the uniform distribution are combined
with n draws from the corresponding power distribution (α =3 ) , such that
{cij,c ij = yj + xij,i=1 ,.,k; j =1 ,..,n}
is a matrix of simulated costs. The matrix of associated bids is calculated according to the
equilibrium bid function. The values of n and k are set to equal 400 and 2, respectively. I
replicate each experiment 500 times and illustrate the resulting distributions of the estimators.
Independent Costs. First, I apply a procedure that accounts for unobserved auction
heterogeneity to the bid data based on the independent costs draws, i.e., data with a degenerate
common component. This experiment corresponds to case 1 in the tables 1b and 2b. Figures 1b
and 2b present the results of the estimation. As ﬁgure 2b shows, the estimated density of the
common component is close to degenerate. It is not exactly degenerate due to the estimation
error. The estimates indicate that the error is always conﬁned to the interval of an order
of 0.2.F i g u r e 1b shows that at the same time, the density of the individual component is
estimated quite precisely. In particular, the true density function lies within a 95% pointwise
conﬁdence interval of the corresponding estimator. It is also true for the bid function, expected
bid function and expected density.
Non-trivial Unobserved Auction Heterogeneity Component. Figures 3b and 4b demon-
strate the estimation results when the procedure is applied to the data with non-trivial unob-
10I considered combinations of several distributions to analyze the behavior of the estimation procedure, and
the results were very similar to those presented here.
18served auction heterogeneity component. This experiment corresponds to case 2 in the tables
1b and 2b. In particular, I consider two sub-cases: in the ﬁrst sub-case the common component
is chosen to be relatively small (case 2a) and in the second sub-case it is relatively large (case
2b). The results of estimation indicate that estimation procedure performs equally well in
both cases. In general, the estimation results are somewhat less precise as compared to the
case 1. The experimentation with diﬀerent distributions shows that the estimator is the least
precise around the mode of the distribution. In the case of the uniform distribution, it is the
least precise around the ends of the support; for the power distribution, the precision is worst
at the right end of the support. However, the estimates for both the density of the common
component and the density of the individual components are still reasonably close to the true
densities. In particular, the true densities lie within a 95% pointwise conﬁdence interval of the
estimators. The same is true for the estimators of the individual bid function, expected bid
function, and the estimated density of total costs.
Aﬃliated Private Values. Next, I evaluate the performance of the estimation procedure
when data are generated by the aﬃliated private values model. This experiment corresponds
to case 3 in the tables 1b and 2b. As before, the cost realizations are equal to the sum of draws
from two distributions: X and Y , where X has a uniform distribution and Y is distributed
according to power distribution. However, in this case I assume that bidder i observes only her
cost realization, ci = xi + y, but not xi or y. I derive an analytical expression for the bidding
function according to the characterization result stated in Milgrom and Weber (1982) and use
it to compute bid values corresponding to the sample of cost draws. I consider two sub-cases:
in the ﬁrst sub-case the Y component is chosen to be relatively small (case 3a)a n di nt h e
second sub-case it is relatively large (case 3b). The results of estimation presented in table 2b
show that the recovered expected cost density is tighter than the true cost distribution. The
recovered expected bid function is steeper than the true bid function. On average, estimated
expected mark-up is smaller than the true one.
Correlated Individual Components. Another experiment analyzes the performance of
the estimation procedure when individual cost components are correlated (case 4). The under-
lying cost realizations are generated as a sum of draws from three distributions: X0, X1, and









realizations of individual components, and yj is a realization of the common cost component.
The distributions of X0 and X1 are uniform and the distribution of the common cost compo-
nent Y is power with exponent three. The bidding function is derived taking into account the
correlation between individual components, and bid realizations are computed by evaluating
the bid function at cost realizations. As before, I consider two sub-cases: in the ﬁrst sub-case
the X1 component is chosen to be relatively small and thus aﬃliation is rather weak (case
194a), and in the second sub-case it is relatively large (case 4b). In the case 4, the estimation
procedure tends to overestimate the variance of the common component and underestimate
the variance of the individual component. This eﬀect decreases as the variance of X1 decreases
and practically vanishes when the correlation is about 5% of the variance of X.I n f a c t , i t
seems that a small amount of correlation between individual cost components improves the
performance of the procedure. The estimated individual bid function tends to underestimate
the true mark-ups but the estimated expected bid function produces almost unbiased estimates
of the true expected bid function. The last eﬀect arises because variance of Y is overestimated.
Because of this eﬀe c tt h ee s t i m a t e dd i s t r i b u t i o no ft o t a lc o s t si sa l s oa na l m o s tu n b i a s e de s -
timator of the true distribution of expected total costs. the bias increases as the strength of
aﬃliation increases.
Correlated Common and Individual Components. Finally, I investigate the performance
of the procedure when individual components are correlated with the common component but
not with each other (case 5). The underlying cost realizations are generated as a sum of draws
from distributions of three random variables: X0, X1, and Y0,n a m e l y ,c1j = x1j + yj and















0 is a common component. The distributions are chosen as follows: the
distributions of X0 and X1 are uniform and the distribution of Y0 is a power distribution
with exponent three. The bidding function is derived for the bidders’ beliefs corresponding
to the distribution of X0 + X1. As before, I consider two sub-cases: in the ﬁrst sub-case
the X1 component is chosen to be relatively small (case 5a)a n di nt h es e c o n ds u b - c a s ei ti s
relatively large (case 5b). The results of estimation presented in the table 2b show that the
recovered distribution of the common component tends to have larger variance than the true
distribution of Y, and the recovered distribution of X tends to have smaller variance than the
true distribution. Changes in variances are consistent with the variance of the joint part of X
and Y being added to the variance of Y and subtracted from the variance of X. Therefore, it
conﬁrms our intuition that the estimation procedure decomposes the sum of random variables
into the orthogonal components. This eﬀect decreases as the correlation between X and Y
decreases and practically vanishes when the correlation is about 5% of the variance of X.I n
fact, it seems that a small amount of correlation between X and Y improves the performance
of the procedure. Similar to the case of correlated individual components, the estimated
individual bid function tends to underestimate the true mark-ups, but the estimated expected
bid function and the estimated distribution of total costs produce almost unbiased estimates
o ft h et r u ee x p e c t e db i df u n c t i o na n dt h et r u ed i s t r i b u t i o no ft o t a lc o s t s .
The second part of the study aims to evaluate the magnitude and direction of the
bias that arises when estimation procedures that ignore the presence of unobserved auction
20heterogeneity are applied to the data generated by the model with unobserved auction hetero-
geneity. In particular, I obtain estimates under the assumption of independent private values
and aﬃliated private values respectively. In this analysis I allow the ratio between the vari-
ance of the individual cost component and the variance of the common cost component to vary.
Estimation results are summarized in the table 3b. I use average mark-ups over the bidders’
costs to compare the bidding function’s estimators across diﬀerent estimation procedures. Es-
timation results indicate that bid functions estimated under the assumption of independent
private values or aﬃliated private values tend to underestimate bidders’ costs and therefore
overestimate the mark-ups over the bidders’ costs. The bias increases as the ratio between
variances of the common and individual components increases, i.e., as the correlation between
costs increases. In particular, this eﬀect becomes signiﬁcant when the correlation coeﬃcient is
around or exceeds 0.3. The bid functions estimated by the IPV and APV procedures are ﬂatter
than the true inverse bid function for most of the support. In particular, the IPV estimator
gets increasingly ﬂatter at the lower end of the support. Intuitively, the presence of the known
common component leads to a bid distribution with very thin tails. Under the assumption of
independent private values, such a distribution reﬂects extreme bid shading at the lower end
of the support, or an extremely ﬂat bid function.
Table 3b also presents estimates of the mean and variance of the cost distribution across
estimation procedures and for diﬀerent values of the variance of the common component. The
results suggest that the cost distributions estimated under both the independent and aﬃliated
private values assumptions tend to have lower means and higher variances compared to the
true cost distribution.
To summarize, results of the simulation study show that the procedure performs reason-
ably well when applied to data generated by the model with unobserved auction heterogeneity
and also when a small amount of correlation between individual components and/or a corre-
lation between the individual component and common cost component is present. They also
show that if an estimation procedure that relies on the assumption of no unobserved auction
heterogeneity is applied to data with a signiﬁcant amount of unobserved auction heterogeneity,
it can lead to substantially biased estimates of bidding function, mark-ups and the probability
density function of bidders’ costs.
So far, I have described identiﬁcation conditions, proposed an estimation procedure,
and discussed small sample properties of the estimator using a Monte-Carlo study.
215 Michigan Highway Procurement Auctions
This section describes characteristics of the Michigan highway procurement auctions. Section
5.1 and 5.2 present the data and report descriptive evidence of auction-speciﬁc variation in the
bids distribution. Section 5.3 describes estimation results for the model with unobserved het-
erogeneity and compares them to the estimates obtained under the assumption of independent
and aﬃliated private values. The estimates suggest that unobserved auction heterogeneity may
account for a large part of bid variation. If unobserved auction heterogeneity is present, estima-
tors obtained under alternative assumptions may substantially exaggerate bidders’ mark-ups
and misrepresent the shape of the cost distribution.
5.1 Market Description
The Michigan Department of Transportation (DoT) is responsible for construction and main-
tenance of most roads within Michigan. The Department of Transportation identiﬁes work
that has to be done and allocates it to companies in the form of projects through a ﬁrst-price
sealed bid auction. The project usually involves a small number of tasks, such as resurfacing,
or replacing the base or ﬁlling in cracks.
Letting process. The Department of Transportation advertises projects 4 to 10w e e k s
prior to the letting date. Advertisement usually consists of a short description of the project,
including the location, completion time and a short list of the tasks involved. Companies
interested in the project can obtain a detailed description from the DoT.
Estimated cost. The DoT constructs a cost estimate for every project. This estimate
is based on the engineer’s assessment of the work required to perform each task and prices
derived from the winning bids for similar projects let in the past. The costs are then adjusted
through a price deﬂator.
Federal law requires that the winning bid should be lower than 110% of the engineer’s
estimate. If a state decides to accept a bid that is higher than this threshold, it has to justify
this action in writing. In this case the engineer’s estimate has to be revised and veriﬁed for any
possible mistake. In my data set, I observe a number of bids higher than 110% of the engineer’s
estimate. On multiple occasions, the winning bid is higher than this threshold. These facts
suggest that bidders consider the probability of an event when this restriction comes into eﬀect
to be rather small. The assumption of no reserve price is justiﬁed in this environment.
Number of bidders. It is unclear if the auction participants have a good idea about the
number of their competitors. The existing literature on highway procurement auctions tends
to argue that this is a small market where participants are well informed about each other
22and can accurately predict the identities of auction participants.11 I follow this tradition and
assume that the number of actual bidders is known to auction participants.
5.2 Descriptive Statistics
I use data for highway procurement auctions held by the Michigan Department of Transporta-
tion (DoT) between February 1997 and December 2003. In particular, I focus on highway
maintenance projects with bituminous resurfacing as the main task. The data set consists of
a total of 3,947 projects. My information includes the letting date, the completion time, the
location, the tasks involved, the identity of all the bidders, their bids, an engineer’s estimate,
and a list of planholders.
My choice of the projects’ type is motivated by two objectives. First, I want to ensure
that auction environment is characterized by private rather than common values. Second, I
am looking for an environment that is likely to have unobserved auction heterogeneity. High-
way maintenance projects are usually precisely speciﬁed and relatively simple. It is likely that
bidders can predict their own costs for the project quite well. The existing uncertainty is,
therefore, associated with variation in costs across ﬁrms, which is consistent with the private
values environment. This variation is generated by diﬀerences in opportunity costs and input
prices faced by diﬀerent ﬁrms. Further, although highway maintenance projects are rather
simple, their costs can be substantially aﬀected by local conditions such as elevation and cur-
vature of the road; traﬃc intensity; age and quality of the existing surface. Information about
these features may not be available to the researcher. On the other hand, ﬁrms’ representa-
tives usually travel to the project site and therefore are likely to collect this information and
incorporate it in their bids. Hence, I expect to ﬁnd unobserved auction heterogeneity.
The paving companies participating in the maintenance auctions mostly diﬀer by their
size (employment, number of locations), specialization (single vs. multiple tasks), and fre-
quency of participation in the DoT market. Each of these three features may potentially imply
cost diﬀerences. The size maybe important if economies of scale are present. For example,
larger companies are likely to own their equipment instead of renting it, which maybe cost
reducing. Specialization may be important because projects in my data set usually involve
some auxiliary work, such as marking or landscaping. A ﬁrm that specializes in paving may
have to subcontract these tasks, whereas a ﬁrm with multiple specializations may be able to
perform all the tasks internally. This may result in cost diﬀerences. Frequency of participation
reﬂects experience with DoT projects. Construction Business Handbook notes that "...in most
government contracts, a body of standard speciﬁcations have developed over the years. ...
11See, for example, Bajari and Ye (2003).
23A bidder is required to learn a whole new and separate body of speciﬁcations..." Therefore
companies that infrequently participate in the DoT market may have higher costs due to the
limited experience with DoT projects. On the other hand, infrequency of participation maybe a
manifestation of some inherent cost disadvantages or dynamic strategies of the company. Since
size, specialization and frequency are observable to all market participants it is important to
allow for the possibility that market participants have diﬀerent beliefs about the distribution
of costs for groups of companies that diﬀer according to these features. Therefore, I allow
for asymmetries between bidders. In particular, I distinguish between two types of bidders:
regular (large) bidders and fringe bidders. The set of regular bidders is deﬁned to include
large companies that frequently participate in auctions held by the DoT and have multiple
specializations. In particular, it includes ﬁr m st h a ts u b m i ta tl e a s t12b i d sp e ry e a r ,a r ew i t h i n
the top 10% of ﬁrms according to the employment size, and specialize in three or more types
of tasks. The set of fringe bidders includes all other companies. It may be worth noting that
the set of regular bidders is completely deﬁned by the ﬁrst two conditions. All large companies
submitted at least 12 bids per year and specialized in multiple tasks. However, some of the
companies that submitted many bids are quite small as well as may specialize in only one task.
Companies that specialize in many tasks tend to be large.
In my data, the number of bidders per project varies between 1 and 11. More than 85%
of projects attracted between 2 to 6 bidders with the mean number of bidders equalling 3.4
and standard deviation of 1.3. About 75% of the projects have an engineer’s estimate between
$100,000 and $1,000,000; 5% are below $100,000 and 20% are above $1,000,000.
Table 1c provides summary statistics of several important variables by the number of
bidders. It shows that the mean of the engineer’s estimate does not change signiﬁcantly across
groups of projects that attracted diﬀerent number of bidders. The tabulation of the winning
bid indicates that the diﬀerence between the engineer’s estimate and the winning bid is positive
and increases with the number of bidders, which implies that the engineer’s estimate may not
be a good indicator of the costs of the project. An important statistic of the data is “money
left on the table” as represented by the diﬀerence between the lowest and second-to-lowest bid
normalized by the engineer’s estimate. This variable is usually taken to indicate the extent
of uncertainty present in the market. ”Money left on the table” is, on average, equal to 7%
of the engineer’s estimate and decreases with the number of bidders. The magnitude of the
"money left on the table" variable is similar to the ﬁndings of other studies.12 It indicates that
cost uncertainty may be substantial. Table 1c also shows that the number of regular bidders
is usually between 1 and 3 and increases only slightly with the total number of bidders.
Next, I explore if there is a scope for unobserved auction heterogeneity in my data.
12See, for example, Jofre-Bonnet and Pessendorfer (2003).
24Table 2c presents results of the regression analysis of bid levels. It includes results of simple
OLS regression, OLS regression with auction dummies and random eﬀects regression. Each
regression controls in a ﬂexible way for ﬁrm and auction features observable to a researcher. In
particular, I estimate the relationship between bid levels and the engineer’s estimate, time to
complete the project (duration), the smallest distance between ﬁrm’s locations and the project
site (Distance), the ﬁrm’s backlog13 at the time of bidding, number of potential bidders and
indicator whether ﬁrm is a regular bidder. I use logarithms of bids, the engineer’s estimate,
and the backlog variable. These variables are measured in hundreds of thousands of dollars.
Distance is measured in tens of miles. Regression analysis is performed conditional on the main
task of the project and number of bidders. presented results correspond to the bituminous
resurfacing projects with four bidders. OLS regression indicates that the engineer’s estimate,
distance to the project site, and backlog variable have a positive and statistically signiﬁcant
impact on the submitted bid. The eﬀect of distance to the project on the bid level is quite
small. It is about $300 for every 10 extra miles. The time of completion does not produce a
signiﬁcant impact on the bid level. On the other hand, fringe bidders bid, on average, $20,000
more than regular bidders. As expected the number of potential bidders has negative eﬀect
on the bid level. The second-order and interaction terms are not statistically signiﬁcant. This
analysis produces R2 equal to 0.81 which indicates that variables included in the regression
describe factors aﬀecting bid levels quite well. However, when auction dummies are added to
the set of explanatory variables R2 increases to 0.89 which indicates that substantial amount
of inter-auction variation cannot be explained by the variables available to the researcher.
This result suggests that unobserved auction heterogeneity maybe present. The results of the
random eﬀects regression are very similar to the ﬁrst two sets of results. They show that about
48% of the residual variation in the log’s of bids may be across auctions. Thus, the regression
analysis provides strong evidence for the importance of unobserved auction heterogeneity in
Michigan highway procurement auctions.
5.3 Estimation Results
Estimation results presented below correspond to the set of projects with an engineer’s estimate
between $500,000 and $900,000 and time to completion between 6 and 9 months that attracted
two regular and two fringe bidders. This set consists of 487 projects. The results for diﬀerent
values of engineer’s estimate, duration, and the number of bidders are qualitatively similar.
In the estimation, the mean of the high type is normalized to be equal to one. Figures
13Backlog of the ﬁrm i is computed as a sum of the projects won by ﬁrm i that have not reached the completion
deadline weighted by the ratio of time remaining before the project deadline to the total time allocated for the
project.
251c and 2c present estimated distributions of the common and individual cost components. The
recovered distribution of the common component has a mean equal to $654,000 and a standard
deviation of $31,700. The recovered distributions of individual components for high and low
types are very similar. The individual cost component of fringe type has a slightly higher mean
and variance than the individual cost component of the regular type. The mean of the fringe
type distribution is 1.2 . Standard deviations of the regular and fringe type distributions are
0.22 and 0.23, respectively.
Variance decomposition. Recall that bidder i0s cost for project j is given by cij = yj∗xij.
Taylor approximation applied to C(.,.) as a function of X and Y allows us to approximate the
variance of C in the following way:
Var (c)=( EY)2Var (X)+( EX)2Var (Y ).
If (EY)2Var (X) and (EX)2Var (Y ) are taken to represent parts of the cost variation generated
by the variation in the individual and common cost components respectively, then it can be
calculated that the individual cost component accounts for almost 15% of variation in the
cost.14
Mark-ups over the bidders’ costs. The estimated inverse bid functions are used to com-
pute mark-ups over the bidders costs. The normalized mark-up, b−c
c = a−x
x ,x= φ(a), ranges
from 0.1% to 25% and, on average, is equal to 7.5% for the regular bidder. Mark-ups for the
fringe type bidders range between 0.1%t o18% and, on average, are equal 6%. Mark-ups for
the winning bid are, on average, equal to 16% and 14% respectively.
Ineﬃcient outcomes. When bidders are asymmetric, it is possible that the project is
not awarded to the lowest cost bidder, i.e., the auction outcome is not eﬃcient. To compute
the probability of such event for the selected set of projects, I use the estimated distributions
of cost components to create a pseudo-sample of cost vectors, where for each vector two draws
are taken from the cost distribution of regular type and two draws from the cost distribution
of the fringe type. Then, for each cost draw, the bid value is calculated on the basis of the
14Note that this decomposition does not depend on our choice of mean normalization. Suppose that X0 and
Y0 are true random variables representing the individual and common cost components, respectively. Due to
normalization we are working with X = 1












2Va r (Y )=( EX0)
2Va r(Y0).
26estimated bidding function. Finally, the fraction of the auctions in which the lowest bids do
not correspond to the lowest costs is computed. This exercise is repeated 100 times. I ﬁnd
that the estimated probability of ineﬃcient outcome is, on average, equal to 28% with 95%
quantile range given by [26.6, 30.3].
Comparison to alternative auction models. Figure 4c compares the expected bid func-
tion estimated under the assumption of unobserved auction heterogeneity to the bid function
recovered under the aﬃliated private values (APV) and independent private values (IPV) as-
sumptions, respectively.15 Both the IPV and APV procedures estimate total costs that are
substantially lower than the expected costs estimated under the unobserved auction hetero-
geneity assumptions both for low and high type. In particular, the model with unobserved
auction heterogeneity implies an average mark-up over the bidders’ costs of around 7%. In
contrast, the model with aﬃliated private values predicts average mark-ups of 11%, whereas
the model with independent private values predicts 15%. The diﬀerence amounts to $33,000 in
t h ec a s eo fa ﬃliated private values and $61,000 for the model with independent private values.
In both cases, conﬁdence intervals for the IPV and APV estimates intersect the conﬁdence
interval constructed under the null of unobserved heterogeneity only for a very small part near
t h eu p p e re n do ft h es u p p o r t . F i n a l l y ,t h em o d e l sw i t hp r i v a t ea n da ﬃliated values predict
a higher probability of ineﬃcient outcome: 34% and 38%, respectively. These results suggest
that the APV and IPV models may lead to signiﬁcant overestimation of mark-ups and thus
erroneous policy conclusions if the data are generated by the model with unobserved auction
heterogeneity.
Figure 4c compares the expected density function of the cost distribution estimated
under the assumption of unobserved auction heterogeneity to the cost density functions recov-
ered under APV and IPV assumptions.16 The IPV and APV densities are much ﬂatter relative
to the density function estimated under the assumption of unobserved auction heterogeneity.
In both cases, conﬁdence intervals for the IPV and APV estimates intersect the conﬁdence
interval constructed under the null of unobserved auction heterogeneity only for a very small
part near the upper end of the support. The variance of the cost distribution estimated un-
der the assumption of unobserved auction heterogeneity is about 25% lower that the variance
of the cost distribution estimated under the assumption of aﬃliated private values and 35%
lower than the variance of the cost distribution estimated under the assumption of indepen-
dent private values. Therefore, if data are generated by the model with unobserved auction
heterogeneity, then the models that fail to account for unobserved auction heterogeneity tend
15To compute the value of the expected inverse bid function at a point b,Iﬁrst derived total costs for every
v a l u eo ft h ec o m m o nc o m p o n e n tt h a tc o u l dh a v er e s u l t e di nab i db a n dt h e nc o m p u t e da ne x p e c t a t i o no ft o t a l
costs with respect to the distribution of the common component.
16The total cost density function is computed as a convolution of the density functions of the common and
the individual cost component.
27to overestimate the uncertainty present in the market.
Measuring ﬁt. To measure the ﬁt of the model, I generate a sample of pseudo-bids on
the basis of the model with unobserved auction heterogeneity and draws from the estimated
distributions of the cost components. I then construct an estimate of the pseudo-bid densities
for two types of bidders and compare them to the densities estimated from the real bids. Results
for regular type bidders’ are presented in Figure 5c. It shows that for both types, densities
of pseudo-bids are very similar to the estimated bid densities. The largest discrepancy occurs
near the mode of distribution, which is a typical feature of this estimation procedure as we
have observed in the Monte Carlo section.
Evaluating assumptions of the model. The identiﬁcation and estimation of the model
with unobserved auction heterogeneity relies on the assumption about functional relation be-
tween total costs and cost components and the assumption that individual cost components are
independent from each other and from the common cost component. Proposition 2 from the
identiﬁcation section allows us to evaluate validity of these assumptions in the data. It exploits
the observation that the same methodology which we used to recover the distributions of indi-
vidual bid and common cost components from the joint distribution of (log(B1),l o g (B2)) can
be used to recover the distributions of the individual bid components of B1,B 2,B 3 from the
joint distribution of (log(B1)−log(B3)), (log(B2)−log(B3)). This suggests two checks for the
internal consistency of the model. Let us suppose that B1 and B3 represent bids submitted by
bidders of the regular type, whereas B2 represent bids submitted by bidders of the fringe type.
Then, if functional relation assumption and independence of individual components hold in the
data, the distributions of individual bid components A1 and A3 recovered from the joint distri-
bution of (log(B1)−log(B3)), (log(B2)−log(B3)) should look very similar. On the other hand
if functional form assumption is very imprecise then the dependence in (log(B1)−log(B3)) and
(log(B2) − log(B3)) is generated not only by log(A3) but also by some random variable that
captures diﬀerence between the true and assumed functional form. In this case, we are likely
to recover diﬀerent distributions for the A1 and A3. Also, if individual cost components, and
thus individual bid components, are not independent, then the estimate for the distribution of
the A1 is likely to underestimate the variance of the individual bid component of B1, whereas
an estimate for the distribution of A3 is likely to overestimate the variance of individual bid
component of B3. This provides the ﬁrst check on the model. The second check arises from
the fact that we do not use an assumption about independence of the individual cost compo-
nents from the common cost component when recovering distributions of A1, A2 and A3 from
the joint distribution of (log(B1) − log(B3)), (log(B2) − log(B3)). Therefore, if this assump-
tion holds in the data then the distributions of A1 and A2 recovered from joint distribution
of (log(B1) − log(B3)), (log(B2) − log(B3)) should be very similar to the distributions of A1
28and A2 recovered from joint distribution of (log(B1),l o g (B2)). On the other hand if this as-
sumption is violated then the estimated distributions of A1 and A2 produced by the second
procedure are likely to have smaller variances than the the estimated distributions of A1 and
A2 produced by the ﬁrst procedure.
Table 3c presents estimation results for the two methodologies when B1 and B3 rep-
resent bids submitted by the regular type. In particular, it shows variances of the estimated
distributions. The formal test that would allow us to establish if two sets of estimates are
statistically diﬀerent has not yet been developed in the literature. However, the estimates for
the distribution of individual bid component look reasonably similar for the random variables
A1 and A3 as well as across methodologies. This gives us conﬁdence that the assumptions of
the model hold at least approximately.
Robustness check. I perform several robustness checks to verify if my estimates are
sensitive to some of the assumptions about auction environment.
The model of bidding behavior that I take to the data assumes that ﬁrms’ bidding
decisions are independent across auctions. This assumption maybe violated if bidders’ decisions
are aﬀected by dynamic considerations. In particular, when company is capacity constrained it
has to take into account the eﬀect of winning project today on its ability to explore proﬁtable
opportunities tomorrow. If dynamic links between auctions are substantial in magnitude our
estimates of the characteristic function of joint distribution of two bids submitted in the same
auction may be biased which in turn would lead to biased estimates for the distributions of
cost components. To evaluate the eﬀect of dynamic links on the performance of the estimation
procedure I re-estimate the model for the subset of projects, such that all regular ﬁrms bidding
for the projects in this subset have their backlog variable between 30% and 75% of the maximum
of backlog variable for this ﬁrm observed in our data. Even though this exercise substantially
reduces the number of available projects and therefore leads to less precise estimates, the
results of the estimation are quantitatively similar. In particular, ﬁndings about variance
decomposition and biases from misspeciﬁcation hold.
Presence of unobserved auction heterogeneity manifests itself through the correlation
between bids submitted in the same auction. It is possible, however, that the correlation
between bids is generated through some other mechanism. For example, it may arise if the
auction environment has common values features. It may also arise if participating companies
are systematically engaged in collusive behavior. I deal with the ﬁrst issue by restricting my
attention to maintenance projects that are unlikely to have any project-related uncertainty
t h a tc o u l dl e a dt oac o m m o nv a l u e se ﬀect.
It is much harder to reject a possibility of collusion, since all the tests proposed in
29the literature depend on the particular collusion scheme employed. I use the test proposed by
Porter in Zona (1993), which is based on the assumption that if there is a collusion scheme, then
only the winning bid corresponds to a real cost realization and all other bids are "phony,", i.e.,
unsubstantiated by any cost realization. I use a procedure described in Athey and Haile (2001)
to recover distribution of high and low type bids from the distribution of the winning bid. I
then compare these distributions to the ones estimated from the losing bids. Distributions
estimated through these two procedures appear to be similar, which gives us conﬁdence that
t h ed a t ad on o tr e ﬂect the outcome of collusive behavior.
6C o n c l u s i o n
This paper proposes a semi-parametric procedure to recover the distribution of bidders’ private
information in the market for highway procurement when unobserved auction heterogeneity is
present. I derive suﬃcient conditions under which the model is identiﬁed and show that the
estimation procedure produces uniformly consistent estimators of the distributions in question.
Using data for highway maintenance projects collected by the Michigan Department of Trans-
portation, I estimate that conditional on the number of bidders, the type of the project as
deﬁned by the main task, and the size and duration bracket, about 75% of the project cost is
a common knowledge among bidders. Therefore, private information accounts for only 25% of
the project costs. Results of the estimation further reveal that the estimation procedures that
ignore unobserved auction heterogeneity tend to estimate lower costs and higher mark-ups.
They also tend to overestimate the variance of the distribution of bidders’ costs.
My estimation procedure relies on the assumptions of the independence of individual
cost components across bidders and from the common cost component. These assumptions
seem consistent with the data. The downside of the ﬁrst assumption is that the procedure
cannot recover the distribution of private information if individual components are aﬃliated.
Therefore, I cannot distinguish between the model with unobserved auction heterogeneity
and the model with aﬃliated private values - the two models that generate correlated bids.
However, these two models represent two extremes in the environment with private values.
The model with unobserved auction heterogeneity attributes all correlation to the common
knowledge of the bidders about the project costs, whereas the model with aﬃliated values
interprets the correlation in bids as the correlation of bidders’ costs that occurs due to factors
unknown to the bidders. Therefore, the model with unobserved auction heterogeneity gives
us the minimal and the model with aﬃliated values gives us the maximum amount of private
information, which is consistent with the data.
The analysis is performed conditional on bidders’ decisions to participate in the auction
30and on the number of bidders. The next step in the analysis of unobserved auction hetero-
geneity is to explicitly account for the participation decision of bidders. I address this issue in
ad i ﬀerent paper.
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34A Proofs of Theoretical Results
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 :
LeBrun (1999) and Maskin and Riley (2000) establish that (α1y(.),α 2y(.)) constitutes
a unique vector of equilibrium strategies conditional on Y = y i fa n do n l yi ff u n c t i o n sαky(.)
satisfy a system of diﬀerential equations for every a
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with boundary conditions given by
(A1) αky(y ∗ x)=x and (2) there exists dky ∈ [y ∗ x,y∗ x] such that αky(y ∗ x)=dky.
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y with z in the system of equations (7), we are back to the system of equations
(7), which we know is satisﬁed by αk1(z), which implies that γ1y,γ2y satisfy the system of
35equations (5). They also satisfy corresponding boundary conditions by deﬁnition if dky is set
equal to y∗dy1. Since the solution to the system (5) that satisﬁes boundary conditions (A1) is





When Y = y, z = y ∗ x, where x ∈ [x,x], then
αky(z)=y ∗ αk1(x).
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m1 :
( a )Is t a r tb ye s t a b l i s h i n gas t a t i s t i c a lr e s u l tt h a tIu s et op r o v eT h e o r e m1. Namely,
Lemma 1
Let X be a random variable with the probability density function f(.) and support [x,x],
then the characteristic function of variable X is non-vanishing, i.e. it does not turn into zero
on any non-empty interval of the real line.
Proof
The idea of a proof is to consider the extension of the characteristic function ϕX(t)=
x R
x




eizxf(x)dx at an arbitrary complex point z. It is straightforward to show that
e ϕX(.) is an entire function, i.e. it is inﬁnitely complex diﬀerentiable at every ﬁnite point of
the complex plane. Therefore, it can only be equal to zero in a countable number of points.
Thus the number of points where ϕX(t) is equal to zero cannot be more than countable which
means that ϕX(t) is non-vanishing.







Notice that for every k e ϕ
(k)
X (z) is well deﬁned due to the boundedness of the X’s u p p o r t .
That concludes the proof of Lemma 1.
(b) Random variables Y , Ai, log(Y ) and log(Ai) have bounded supports and therefore
have non-vanishing characteristic functions.
36(c) As has been established in Proposition 1, Bkij = yj∗akij, where akij is an individual
bid component. Two bids per auction produce two relationships B1 = Y ∗A1 and B2 = Y ∗A2.
Since Y and Ak’s take only positive values, these relationships can be rewritten as
log(B1)=l o g ( Y )+l o g ( A1),
log(B2)=l o g ( Y )+l o g ( A2).
As we noted before characteristic functions of log(Y ) and log(Ai) are non-vanishing. Therefore
theorem by Kotlarski (1966)17 applies directly to this environment and ensures that distrib-
utions of log(Y ), log(A1), and log(A2) are identiﬁed up to a constant. To ﬁx the constant
we assume that E(log(A1)) = 0. Then, since the distribution functions of log(Y ), log(A1),
and log(A2) are uniquely identiﬁed, and, since log(.) is a strictly monotone function, then the
distribution functions of Y , A1, and A2 are uniquely identiﬁed as well.
Since the individual bid components represent bids that would have been submitted
in the auction game without unobserved heterogeneity and with asymmetric bidders, then the
identiﬁcation of the distribution of the individual cost component from the distribution of the
individual bid component follows according to the results established by Laﬀont and Vuong
(1996).
Remark
The realizations of the common component and individual cost component correspond-
ing to bid bij are not uniquely identiﬁed. In particular, let us denote by bj = {bij} the
vector of bids submitted in the auction j and by xj = {xij} av e c t o ro fi n d i v i d u a lc o s tc o m -
ponent draws in the auction j. We will show now that for a generic bj, (i.e., bj = {bij,







i =m i n (
bij
αi(x),y)}.









with the equality on either side occurring only if xij = x or xij = x.S i n c e t h e e v e n t w h e r e










y0 =m a x ( y0
i ) <y j < min(y0
i )=y0.
For any y ∈ [y0,y0], let us deﬁne aiy =
bij
y ,i=1 ,..,m. Notice that αi(x) ≤ xiy ≤ αi(x)
by construction. This means that the inverse bid function from (D6) c o u l db eu s e dt oﬁnd
xiy such that aiy = αi(xiy). Thus, I have shown that there are multiple pairs (y,{xiy}) that
rationalize bj.
P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n2
(1) The proof follows from the property of independent variables: if the random vari-
ables Z1 and Z2 are independent, then so are f(Z1) and f(Z2), for any function f(.).
(2) If Xi’s are independent, then so are log(Xi). The structure of the bidder’s cost,
ci = y∗xi, implies that log(
B1i1
B1i1
















If bidders 1 and 3 are of the same type then characteristic functions of log(A1) and log(A3)
should be the same, i.e.
f1(t)=f3(t).
(3) If Y and Xi’s are independent, the cost structure is given by cij = yj ∗ xij,t h e n
Kotlarski (1966) theorem applied to (log(Bi1j),log(Bi2j)) implies that the characteristic func-





B2i2j) implies that the characteristic function of log(A1i1j) is given by f1(t).
Thus, the following equality has to hold
Φlog(A1)(t)=f1(t).
38P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n3 :
According to (W2), Φlog(Y )(.), Φlog(A1il)(.) and Φlog(A2ip)(.) are the same for all pairs
(il,i p) such that ip =1 ,..,m1 and il = m1 +1 ,..,m 2.T h i s i m p l i e s t h a t i indices can be
dropped, so that we can focus on just three functions: Φlog(Y )(.), Φlog(A1)(.), and Φlog(A2)(.).
If (W1) is satisﬁed, then there exist independent random variables Y , A1, and A2,
such that the characteristic functions of log(Y ), log(A1), and log(A2) are given by Φlog(Y )(.),
Φlog(A1)(.), Φlog(A2)(.), respectively. Kotlarski (1966) shows that
Φlog(Y )(t1 + t2)Φlog(A1)(t1)Φlog(A2)(t2)=Ψ(t1,t 2).
This equality implies that (log(Y )+log(A1),log(Y )+log(A2)) are distributed the same
as (log(B1),log(B2)).
Let us consider Xk = φk(Ak). Then Y , X1, and X2 deﬁne the model with unobserved
heterogeneity that rationalizes the data.
Two-dimensional model with unobserved heterogeneity
The cost of bidder i is equal to ci = y1 +y2 ∗xi, where Y =( Y1,Y 2) is a random vector
representing the common cost component and X =( X11,..,X1m1,X 2,m1+1,..,X2m). Random
variables (X,Y) are distributed on [y1,y1] × [y2,y2] × [x,x]m according to the probability
distribution function H(.,..,.) with the associated probability density function h(.,..,.).
Assumptions (F1) − (F6) are analogous to (D1) − (D6) of the one-dimensional case.
(F1) The components of Y and X are independent:







where HY1, HY2, HX1 and HX2 are marginal distribution functions of Y1, Y2, X1j, and X2j,
respectively.
(F2) The probability density functions of the individual cost component, hX1 and hX2,
are continuously diﬀerentiable and bounded away from zero on [x,x].
(F3) EX1j =1for all j =1 ,...,m1.
(F4)( a) T h en u m b e ro fb i d d e r si sc o m m o nk n o w l e d g e ;
39(b) There is no binding reservation price;
The condition (F2) ensures the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium in the
auction game corresponding to the realization (y1,y 2) of (Y1,Y 2). The conditions (F1),(F3),
and (F4) provide a basis for the identiﬁcation of the probability density functions of Y1,Y2, A1,
A2,X 1 and X2.
Theorem 1a
If conditions (F1)−(F4) are satisﬁed, then the probability density functions hY1,hY2,hX1,
hX2 are uniquely identiﬁed from the joint distribution of four arbitrary bids (Bi1,B i2,B i3,B i4).
Sketch of the proof
(a) Applying Kotlarski’s argument to the log-transformed random variables (Bi1 −Bi2)
and (Bi3 − Bi4) allows identiﬁcation of the probability density function hY2.
(b) The joint characteristic function of ((Bi1−Bi3),(Bi2−Bi3)) in conjunction with the
characteristic function of Y2 (identiﬁed in (a)) allows identiﬁcation of the joint characteristic
function of ((Ai1−Ai3),(Ai2−Ai3)), which according to the Kotlarski argument in turn implies
that the probability density functions of Ai1 and Ai2 are identiﬁed.
(c) The probability density functions gAi1, hY2 uniquely determine the probability dis-
tribution and thus the characteristic function of Y2 ∗Ai1, which allows unique identiﬁcation of
the probability distribution of Y1 from the characteristic function of Bi1.
(d) The argument developed in Laﬀont and Vuong (1996) can be applied to establish
identiﬁcation of the probability density functions from the probability distribution of Ai1 and
Ai2.
Thus I have established that hY1, hY2, hX1, hX2 are identiﬁed from the joint distribution
of four arbitrary bids.
Similar to the one-dimensional case, the exact realizations of y1j, y2j and {xij} are not
uniquely identiﬁed.
Details of the estimation procedure
Step 1.
1. The log transformation of bid data is performed to obtain LBil =l o g ( Bil) and
LBip =l o g ( Bip), where il =1 ,..,m01 and ip = m01 +1 ,..,m0.










exp(it1 · Bilj + it2 · Bipj)










iBilj exp(it1 · Bilj + it2 · Blpj)
I average over all possible pairs to enhance eﬃciency.
3. The characteristic functions of the log of individual bid components LAk,k=1 ,2,
a n dt h el o go ft h ec o m m o nc o s tc o m p o n e n tLY are estimated as



























for u1 ∈ [log(ak),log(ak)], and u2 ∈ [log(y),log(y)], where T is a smoothing parameter.









for a ∈ [ak,ak], and y ∈ [y,y].
Step 2
1. The estimate of the individual bid component density, e gAk(.), k =1 ,2,i su s e dt o
generate a sample of pseudo-bids {e akj}, j =1 ,....,L.
2. The sample of pseudo bids is used to generate a sample of pseudo-costs as
e x1j = e a1j +
(1 − e GA1(a1j)) · (1 − e GA2(a1j))
(m1 − 1) · e gA1(a1j) · (1 − e GA2(a1j)) + m2 · e gA2(a1j) · (1 − e GA1(a1j))
,
e x2j = e a2j +
(1 − e GA1(a2j)) · (1 − e GA2(a2j))









k is an estimate of the lower bound of the support of gAk(.) (see part A of the Appendix
for the discussion of the support estimation).
3. The density of the individual cost component is non-parametrically estimated from







x − e xkj
δk
),
where Kh(.) is a kernel function, and δhk is the bandwidth.
3a. The estimation procedure described in Step 1 leads to a zero-mean distribution of
log(A1), which does not necessarily correspond to the random variable X1 such that EX1 =
1.T o a r r i v e a t t h e ﬁnal estimates of the distributions in question we have to perform an
adjustment. Let e denote the mean of the estimated distribution of random variable X1.T h e n
b hXk(x)=
e hXk(ex)
e , b hY (y)=ee hY (
y
e) are the ﬁnal estimates of the individual and common cost
component probability density functions.








for c ∈ [x · y,x · y].








where b φk(.) is an estimate of the individual inverse bid function given by
b φ1(a)=a +
(1 − e GA1(a)) · (1 − e GA2(a))
(m1 − 1) · e gA1(a) · (1 − e GA2(a)) + m2 · e gA2(a) · (1 − e GA1(a))
,
b φ2(a)=a +
(1 − e GA1(a)) · (1 − e GA2(a))
m1 · e gA1(a) · (1 − e GA2(a)) + (m2 − 1)e gA2(a) · (1 − e GA1(a))
.
Both integrals were computed using Monte-Carlo integration with respect to b hY (.).
Properties of the Estimator (Proposition 5)
I start by describing how the supports of distributions of the individual bid and the
c o m m o nc o s tc o m p o n e n t sc a nb ee s t i m a t e d .T h e nIp r o c e e dt ot h ep r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n5 .
Estimation of the Support Bounds
Strictly speaking bounds of the support are recovered during the inversion procedure
when the density function of the distribution in question is computed. According to the
inversion formula, the density function recovered from the theoretical characteristic function
should approach zero as smoothing parameter T approaches inﬁnity at every point outside of
the support. Therefore, the upper and lower bounds of the support are respectively deﬁned
as lower and upper limits of the points where density function is equal to zero. In estimation,
the density function recovered from the estimated characteristic function does not, in general,
equal zero outside of the support. An econometrician, therefore, has to choose cut-oﬀ points
43that correspond to suﬃciently low values of the estimated density function. Unfortunately,
econometric theory does not provide us with guidelines on how to choose such cut-oﬀ points.
That is why I use a diﬀerent approach in this paper. I estimate bounds of the supports for
the distributions of interest using restrictions imposed by the model with unobserved auction
heterogeneity. If data are generated by the model with unobserved auction heterogeneity then
this approach leads to consistent estimators of the support bounds. The proof of this statement
and the derivation of the rate of convergence are given together with the proof of proposition 5.
Below I describe a procedure to estimate support bounds of the distributions of the individual
bid and the common cost components.
Notice that the distributions of the components are identiﬁed up to the location only.
So, I start with arbitrary choice of supports, then estimate the shift in supports that accom-
panies the ﬁrst-stage estimation. Finally, after the second-stage I adjust supports, so that
estimated distributions satisfy assumption (D3).
Initially, I ignore the assumption (D3), EXi1 =1 . Instead, I assume that there are no
restrictions on the means of the distributions. To ﬁx the supports of the distributions in ques-
tion, I assume that support of LY is symmetric around zero. I denote the support of the log of
the common component by [−y0,y0] and the support of the log of the individual bid component
of the type 1 bidder by [a1
0,a1
0]. Then the support of the log of bids for type 1 is given by
[a0
1−y0,a0





Since the bounds of these supports can be estimated as [min(log(b1lj)),max(log(b1lj))] and
[min(log(b1lj) − log(b1pj)),max(log(b1lj) − log(b1pj))], we arrive at the system of equations
min(log(b1lj)) = b a0
1 − b y0,
max(log(b1lj)) = b a
0
1 + b y0,
max(log(b1lj) − log(b1pj)) = b a
0
1 − b a0
1,
which can be solved to get
b y0 =











min(log(b1lj)) + max(log(b1lj)) + max(log(b1lj) − log(b1pj))
2
.
Formulas for the estimation of the characteristic function of the common cost component in
(2) and (4) have been derived under the assumption that E(LA1)=0 . Hence, the mean of the
44common component equals the bids’ mean. Thus, the probability density functions b hY (.) and
b hLA1(.) are shifted so as to achieve a zero mean for the distribution of the log of the individual
bid component LA1. If the symmetrization of the common component support initially assigned
am e a no fe1 to the individual bid component of type 1,t h e nS t e p1 is going to produce density
b hLY (.) with the support [−b y0+e1,b y0+e1] and b gLA1(.) with the support [b a0
1−e1,b a0
1−e1], where





ab gLA1(a)da =0 .
I use this equation to estimate e1 through a line search method.
The procedure described above produces estimates for the supports of Y and Ak




1]=[ e x p ( b a0
1 − b e1),exp(b a
0




2]=[ e x p ( min(log(b2lj)) + b y0 − b e1),exp(max(log(b2lj)) − b y0 + b e1)].
P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n5:
First, I describe a set of technical assumptions needed to establish the rate of con-
vergence for the estimators of density functions. Assumption 1 is a more technical version of
assumptions D2,which assumes R =1 . The proof is given for a more general case of R ≥ 1.A s -
sumption 2 concerns the properties of the kernel used in the second-stage estimation. Finally,
assumption 3 describes the choice of the bandwidth in the second-stage estimation.
Assumption 1:
(i) The supports of HXk are given by S(Hk)=[ x,x], x ≥ 0,x≤ x, for k ∈ {1,2};
(ii) hk(.) are bounded away from zero on every closed subset of the interior of S(Hk);
(iii) Hk(.) admit up to R +1continuous bounded derivatives, with R ≥ 1.
Assumption 2:





(iii) Kh(.) is of order R +1 . Thus, moments of order strictly smaller than the given
order vanish.
45Assumption 3:





where λhk is a strictly positive constant and L is the number of pseudo-bid draws in the
second-stage estimation.
The proof consists of several steps.
(1) First, I establish that the distribution function and the probability density func-
tions of the individual bid components inherit properties of the distribution function and the
probability density functions of the individual cost component. Namely,
Lemma 2
Given Assumption 1, the distribution functions GAk(.) satisfy:
(i) its supports S(GAk) are given by [ak,ak] with ak = x;
(ii) GAk admit up to R +1continuous bounded derivatives on every closed subset of
the interior of S(GAk).
(iii) For every closed subset of the interior of S(GAk), there exists cg > 0 such that
|G
(r)
Ak(a)| ≥ cg > 0 on this subset.
Proof
The point (i) is established in section 2. To show that the points (ii) and (iii) holds, I
use the relationship between the distribution functions of the individual bid components and
the distribution functions of the individual cost components. Namely,
GAk(a)=HXk(φk(a)),
where φk(.) is the inverse individual bid function of the bidder of type k. Then, G
(r)
Ak(a) is a




k (a) for u,v = {1,..,r}. By the equilibrium characterization
φk(.) is continuously diﬀerentiable and monotonically increasing. This implies that φk(.) is
bounded and a>φ k(a) on every closed subset of the interior of S(GAk). The necessary ﬁrst













This representation can further be used to show that {φ
(u)
k (.)}u≤R+1 are well deﬁned, continuos
46and therefore bounded on every closed subset of the interior of S(GAk). Hence {G
(r)
Ak(.)}r≤R+1
are well deﬁned, continuos and bounded on every closed subset of the interior of S(GAk). Point
(iii) then follows from the properties of {H
(u)
Xk(.)}u≤R+1 and properties of the equilibrium bid
function.
(2) If probability density functions of cost components are ordinarily smooth of order
κ > 1, then Theorems 3.1- 3.2 in Li and Vuong (1998) apply that establish uniform consistency
of the ﬁrst stage estimators. In particular, they establish that
sup
y∈S(HLY )





















and a ∈ [ak,ak], ak >x k > 0,t h e n
sup
y∈S(HY )














(3) Uniform consistency of the estimators for the individual inverse bid function and
the probability density function of the individual component follows the logic of Proposition 3
and Theorem 3 of Guerre, Perrigne, Vuong (2000).
(a) First, we derive the rate of convergence for the support bounds, ak and ak. Recall
that bounds of supports have been derived in several steps. First, supports of the distributions
of LB1i and (LB1i1 − LB1i2) have been estimated as
47[min(log(b1lj)),max(log(b1lj))]
[min(log(b1lj) − log(b1pj)),max(log(b1lj) − log(b1pj))].
These are maximum likelihood estimators for the support bounds of corresponding
densities. (They are well deﬁned due to (v) of Lemma 2.) We know that they converge to the
true value of the support bounds at the rate of n. The preliminary estimates for the bounds
of LAk supports, b a0
k and b a
0
k, are obtained as linear functions of the support bounds for LB1i
and (LB1i1 − LB1i2). Therefore, they also converge to the true support bounds at the rate
of n. Next stage obtains intermediate estimates of the support bounds, b a1
k and b a
1
k. They are
obtained from b a0
k and b a
0
k through a shift by an adjustment factor e1.A ne x t r e m u me s t i m a t o r













ab gLA1(a + b e1)da − b e1)2.






at the same rate as b gLA1 converges to gLA1 (see Li and Vuong (1998) for an appropriate rate
of convergence). Let us denote this rate by dn. It can be shown that all standard conditions
for the convergence of extremum estimators hold and b e1 converges to e1 at the rate dn.T h u s ,
intermediate estimators of the support bounds of LAk, b a1
k and b a
1
k, converge to the corresponding
true values at the rate dn. The bounds of supports for Ak are estimated as b ak = exp(b a1
k) and
b ak = exp(b a
1
k), respectively. The smoothness of the exponential function ensures consistency of
these estimators. The delta method can be used to show that the rate of convergence remains
equal to dn.
(b) The rate of convergence for b gAk(.) is established in Li and Vuong (1998). Recall
that here we denote it dn. Now we derive a rate of convergence for b GAk. The estimator for





48To establish consistency we consider
¯ ¯ ¯b GAk(a) − GAk(a)
¯ ¯ ¯ ≤




¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
+
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
a Z
ak
(b gAk(a) − gAk(a))da
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
.
Since gAk is a continuous function with bounded support, (D9),t h e ngAk is a bounded function.
For large enough n, b gAk is also bounded a.s. due to uniform convergence of b gAk to gAk. Then,
part (b) implies that the ﬁrst summand converges to zero at the rate dn. The second summand
also converges to zero at the rate dn since support of gAk is bounded. Therefore, b GAk converges
to GAk at the rate dn.
(d) Next, we prove uniform consistency of the estimator for the individual cost com-
ponent. Recall that the individual cost components corresponding to the individual bid com-
ponents ak are estimated as
e x1 = e a1 +
(1 − e GA1(a1)) · (1 − e GA2(a1))
(m1 − 1) · e gA1(a1) · (1 − e GA2(a1)) + m2 · e gA2(a1) · (1 − e GA1(a1))
,
e x2j = e a2j +
(1 − e GA1(a2)) · (1 − e GA2(a2))
m1 · e gA1(a2) · (1 − e GA2(a2)) + (m2 − 1) · e gA2(a2) · (1 − e GA1(a2))
.
Similar to Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong (2000) I restrict my attention to the subset of the
support
V (GAk)={a ∈ [ak,ak] such that (a ± 2δk) ∈ S(Hk).
Notice that for every a1j ∈ V (GAk) corresponding x1j is ﬁnite. For every a ∈ V (GAk), b gAk(a) ≥
cg > 0 and (1 − b GAk(a)) ≥ cG > 0 for some cg and cG,s i n c eb gAk and b GAk uniformly converge
to gAk and GAk, respectively, and (ii) of Lemma 2.
Below I sketch the argument that establishes uniform convergence of e x1j to x1j.
Let us denote
ξ1(a1)=
(1 − GA1(a1)) · (1 − GA2(a1))
(m1 − 1) · gA1(a1) · (1 − GA2(a1)) + m2 · gA2(a1) · (1 − GA1(a1))
,
e ξ1(a1)=
(1 − e GA1(a1)) · (1 − e GA2(a1))
(m1 − 1) · e gA1(a1) · (1 − e GA2(a1)) + m2 · e gA2(a1) · (1 − e GA1(a1))
,
49ζ1(a1)=( m1 − 1) · gA1(a1) · (1 − GA2(a1)) + m2 · gA2(a1) · (1 − GA1(a1)),
e ζ1(a1)=( m1 − 1) · e gA1(a1) · (1 − e GA2(a1)) + m2 · e gA2(a1) · (1 − e GA1(a1)),
ε1(a1)=( 1 − GA1(a1)) · (1 − GA2(a1)),
e ε1(a1)=( 1 − e GA1(a1)) · (1 − e GA2(a1)).
Then
|e x1j − x1j| =
¯ ¯ ¯e ξ1(a1) − ξ1(a1)
¯ ¯ ¯,
w h i c hi nt u r nc a nb eb o u n d e db y
¯ ¯ ¯e ξ1(a1) − ξ1(a1)
¯ ¯ ¯ ≤
1
f C1C1
¯ ¯ ¯e ε1(a1)ζ1(a1) − ε1(a1)e ζ1(a1)
¯ ¯ ¯
or
¯ ¯ ¯e ξ1(a1) − ξ1(a1)
¯ ¯ ¯ ≤
1
f C1C1
(|e ε1(a1) − ε1(a1)|·| ζ1(a1)| +
¯ ¯ ¯e ζ1(a1) − ζ1(a1)
¯ ¯ ¯ ·| ε1(a1)|),
or ¯ ¯ ¯e ξ1(a1) − ξ1(a1)
¯ ¯ ¯ ≤
1
f C1
|e ε1(a1) − ε1(a1)| +
e cGcG
f C1C1
¯ ¯ ¯e ζ1(a1) − ζ1(a1)
¯ ¯ ¯,
where C1 =( m1 + m2 − 1)cgcG and e C1 =( m1 + m2 − 1)e cge cG.
Pointwise application of delta method allows us to conclude that
|e ε1(a1) − ε1(a1)| = Op(dn), a.s.
¯ ¯ ¯e ζ1(a1) − ζ1(a1)
¯ ¯ ¯ = Op(dn), a.s.
Then ¯ ¯ ¯e ξ1(a1) − ξ1(a1)
¯ ¯ ¯ = Op(dn), a.s.
To conclude the proof we note that δhk converges to zero as n diverges to inﬁnity (we
choose L so that it diverges to inﬁnity together with n) and thus the statement above holds
50everywhere on the interior of the support.
(d) Finally, we establish uniform convergence of the probability density function of








x − e xkj
δhk
).











Then ¯ ¯ ¯e hXk(x) − hXk(x)
¯ ¯ ¯ ≤
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
e hXk(x) − e e hXk(x)
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ +
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
e e hXk(x) − hXk(x)
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯.
The rate of convergence for the second term depends solely on L and is equal to (
log(L)
L )R/(2R+1)
(see Stone 1992). Next, we focus on the ﬁrst term:
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
e hXk(x) − e e hXk(x)
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ =












¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
.
A second-order Taylor expansion gives
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
e hXk(x) − e e hXk(x)
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ≤


























) · (x − e xkj)2
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
or
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
e hXk(x) − e e hXk(x)
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ≤











¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
·
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
x − e xkj
δhk
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯+














¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
·
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
x − e xkj
δhk




































dx2 (x − z)dzdx
respective, which ensures that corresponding terms are bounded. Recall that the rate of
convergence for (x−xkj) is given by dn.I fδhk is of the order rhk, then the rate of convergence
for the ﬁrst term is given by dn/rhk. This is also the rate of convergence for e hXk(x) − e e hXk(x),
since the second term has a smaller order of magnitude. The bandwidth is chosen as a function
o ft h en u m b e ro fr a n d o md r a w sL,w h i c h ,i nt u r n ,i saf u n c t i o no fn, the number of auctions
in the data set. The number of draws L c a na l w a y sb ec h o s e ns ot h a tdn/rhk → 0. The rate
of convergence for (e hXk(x) − hXk(x)) is then given by max{dn/rhk,(
log(L)
L )R/(2R+1)}. Notice
that the second term is equal to rhk. Therefore, the fastest achievable rate of convergence
corresponds to rhk '
2 √
dn. This determines the choice of L as a function of n.
52B Results of Monte Carlo Study



















Solid line - true density function; Dotted lines - 5% and 95% pointwise quantiles of the
density estimator



















Dotted lines indicate 5% and 95% pointwise quantiles of the density estimator



















Solid line - the true density function; Dotted lines - 5% and 95% pointwise quantiles of the
density estimator



















Solid line - true density function; Dotted lines - 5% and 95% pointwise quantiles of the
density estimator
56Table 1b: Description of the Simulated Models
Cov (C1,C2)Cov (X1,X2)Cov (X,Y) Var (X) Var (Y) Var ( C ) E(Mark-up)
Case 1 0 0 0 0.33 0 0.33 0.38
Case 2a 0.04 0 0 0.33 0.04 0.37 0.09
Case 2b 0.34 0 0 0.33 0.34 0.67 0.09
Case3a 0.16 0 0 0.33 0.16 0.49 0.47
Case 3b 0.04 0 0 0.33 0.04 0.37 0.21
Case 4a 0.52 0.18 0 0.36 0.34 0.7 0.27
Case 4b 0.36 0.02 0 0.2 0.34 0.54 0.15
Case 5a 0.52 0 0.18 0.36 0.34 0.7 0.11
Case 5b 0.2 0 0.02 0.2 0.18 0.38 0.06
Model
Case 1 Independent Costs
Case 2 Unobserved Auction Heterogeneity
Case 3 Aﬃliated Private Values
Case 4 Correlated Individual Components
Case 5 Individual Components Correlated with Common Component
57Table 2b: Summary of Estimation Results
Var (X) Var(Y) Var( C ) Mark-up
Case 1 0.325 0.013 0.337 0.362
[0.28, 0.34] [0.01, 0.02] [0.28, 0.35] [0.357,0.393]
Case 2a 0.321 0.0362 0.364 0.082
[0.27, 0.36] [0.034, 0.045] [0.312, 0.386] [0.078, 0.095]
Case 2b 0.318 0.335 0.687 0.092
[0.26, 0.37] [0.27, 0.356] [0.61, 0.72] [0.082, 0.098]
Case 3a 0.33 0.18
[0.266, 0.369] [0.153, 0.21]
Case 3b 0.36 0.33
[0.272, 0.385] [0.284, 0.37]
Case 4a 0.176 0.36 0.525 0.137
[0.149, 0.192] [0.347, 0.401] [0.501, 0.584] [0.123, 0.146]
Case 4b 0.254 0.461 0.727 0.238
[0.182, 0.291] [0.416, 0.521] [0.71, 0.773] [0.201, 0.268]
Case 5a 0.187 0.21 0.36 0.052
[0.174, 0.193] [0.19, 0.217] [0.352, 0.368] [0.5, 0.61]
Case 5b 0.174 0.522 0.71 0.098
[0.169, 0.179] [0.512, 0.53] [0.7, 0.722] [0.093, 0.108]
Estimates
58Table 3b: Analysis of Misspeciﬁed Models
Var(Y) E( C ) Var ( C ) E(Mark-up)
0.04 model 10.5 0.37 0.09
0.04 UAH [10.44, 10.59] [0.32, 0.41] [0.078, 0.095]
0.04 APV [10.37, 10.48] [0.35, 0.44] [0.097, 0.12]
0.04 IPV [10.41, 10.5] [0.34, 0.44] [0.95, 0.11]
0.34 model 10.5 0.67 0.03
0.34 UAH [10.28, 10.64] [0.63, 0.72] [0.02, 0.038]
0.34 APV [8.31, 9.57] [0.89, 1.02] [0.042, 0.55]
0.34 IPV [8.85, 9.84] [0.83,0.96] [0.4, 0.52]
1 model 10.5 1.33 0.01
1 UAH [10.15, 10.76] [1.27, 1.43] [0.008, 0.014]
1 APV [7.6, 8.8] [2.01, 2.27] [0.033, 0.047]
1 IPV [8.1, 9.2] [1.86, 2.05] [0.31, 0.044]
In the brackets - 5% and 95% pointwise quantiles of the estimator
Notations: UAH - estimation procedure that relies on the assumption of unobserved
auction heterogeneity; APV - estimation procedure that relies on the assumption of aﬃliated
private values; IPV - estimation procedure that relies on the assumption of independent private
values
59C Michigan Highway Procurement Auctions
Table 1c: Descriptive Statistics of Data
Number of bidders overall 1 2 3 4 5 6
Number of observations 3,947 71 673 1126 1026 365 192
Engineers Estimate (hdrds. th.) mean 12.80 13.34 10.27 12.60 13.90 12.90 16.40
std.dev 2.35 2.88 1.41 3.02 2.26 1.79 3.39
Winning Bid (hdrds. th.) mean 11.10 14.12 10.00 11.80 12.90 11.80 15.20
std.dev 2.32 3.05 1.50 2.89 2.25 1.66 3.35
Money Left on the Table mean 0.07 NA 0.11 0.08 0.07 0.05 0.04
std.dev 0.05 NA 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.04
Number of Regular Bidders mean 1.92 0.79 1.43 1.65 2.07 2.16 2.29
std.dev 1.06 0.41 0.62 0.72 0.98 1.21 1.32
60dependent variable log (B1)
number of observations 947
number of bidders 4
Variable OLS Auction Dummies Random Effects
Log (Estimate) 0.9100 0.9300 0.8800
(0.0530) (0.1400) (0.1300)
Duration -0.0210 -0.0490 -0.0210
(0.0500) (0.0250) (0.0500)
Distance 0.0312 0.0540 0.0270
(0.0160) (0.0120) (0.0160)
Length 0.0700 0.0950 0.0650
(0.4700) (0.3900) (0.4900)
Marking (dummy) 0.1000 0.1200 0.1000
(0.0360) (0.0470) (0.0470)
Landscaping (dummy) 0.8700 0.8100 0.8600
(0.0330) (0.0330) (0.0330)
Sign (dummy) -0.0200 -0.0300 -0.0130
(0.0160) (0.0160) (0.0160)
Log (Load Remaining) 0.0310 0.0392 0.0270
(0.0157) (0.0127) (0.0144)
Number of Potential Bidders -0.1100 -0.1330 -0.1100
(0.0310) (0.0230) (0.0290)
Fringe (Dummy) 0.2500 0.2800 0.2200
(0.1100) (0.1200) (0.1000)
….
Constant 0.1750 0.1620 0.1680
(0.0580) (0.0520) (0.0480)
R











other variables:  district dummies, regular bidders dummies
Table 2c: Bid Analysis (maintenance projects)




















Solid line - the probability density function of common component; Dotted lines: 5% and
95% pointwise quantiles of the density estimator


















Solid lines - 5% and 95% pointwise quantiles of the density estimator for the regular type of
bidders; Dotted lines - 5% and 95% pointwise quantiles of the density estimator for the
"fringe" type




















Solid line - the estimated density of bids for the regular type of bidders; Dotted lines - 5%
a n d9 5 %q u a n t i l e so ft h ee s t i m a t e dd e n s i t yf o rs i m u l a t e db i d s













Solid line - expected bidding strategy estimated under the assumption of unobserved auction
heterogeneity; Dotted lines - 5% and 95% pointwise quantiles for the estimator based on the
assumption of unobserved auction heterogeneity; the ﬁrst perforated line - the bidding
strategy estimated under the assumption of aﬃliated private values; the second perforated
line - the bidding strategy estimated under independent private values




















Solid lines - 5% and 95% pointwise quantiles of the expected probability density function
estimated under the assumption of unobserved auction heterogeneity; dotted line - the
probability density function estimated under the assumption of independent private values;
perforated line - the probability density function estimated under the assumption of aﬃliated
private values
66Table 2c: Evaluating Validity of Independence Assumption
Method 1
(log(B1), log(B2))
recovered as common individual
component component
Var(Xreg) 0.252 0.284 0.205
(0.21, 0.3) (0.2, 0.33) (0.18, 0.29)
Var(Xfringe) 0.27 0.217
(0.22, 0.32) (0.19, 0.31)
Method 2
(log(B1)-log(B3), log(B2)-log(B3))
67